Peace planning for Ukraine is a contest between Trump’s imperial capitalism and Putin’s imperial geopolitics. Who wins? Not Ukraine.

by Wayne Stelk, PhD December 2025

In Brief:

• Transactional Foreign Policy: Despite campaign promises to end the war “on day one,” Donald Trump has failed to resolve Russia’s war in Ukraine after 11 months. Trump’s approach has shifted U.S. foreign policy from traditional principles of national sovereignty to a transactional “peace through business” approach. 
• Commercialized Peace Plan: Recently, a 28-point peace plan was presented by Trump’s real estate associate, Steve Witkoff, but Kirill Dmitriev, a Russian business development officer, apparently wrote it. The formal plan is built on an unspoken agreement that proposes U.S.-Russia commercial deals and the reopening of Russian energy markets over Ukrainian interests. 
• Conflicts of Interest: Trump’s policy of “peace through business” is evident from the fact that the Trump family’s net worth has doubled to roughly $5.4 billion during his second term—driven by foreign real estate and crypto deals—which raises concerns that the peace negotiations are motivated by personal profit rather than geopolitical stability. 
• Historical Parallels: Ukraine and Europe should be aware of the historical parallels between these negotiations and the 1939 Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact, suggesting that while Trump seeks economic gain (similar to Stalin’s motivation in 1939), Putin is using the agreement to hide his true expansionist aims (similar to Hitler). 
• Putin’s Imperialist Goals: Regardless of economic concessions, Vladimir Putin remains driven by the concept of “Novorossiya” (New Russia), viewing all of Ukraine as Russian territory and intending to restore Soviet-era borders unless stopped by a strong countervailing force.

A Note About The Global War on Democracy Series

This post is part of my Global War on Democracy series. All posts in this series are available for free.

Trump’s Promises, Promises

During his 2024 campaign for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump claimed at least 53 times that he would end Russia’s three-year war against Ukraine “on day one” of his administration. After 11 months in office, Trump is still far from ending this conflict. Is it a folly to believe that Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin can find common ground for a peace deal acceptable to Ukraine? 

Should the world care that neither of Trump’s top two peace negotiators, Steve Witcoff, Trump’s comrade in real estate development, nor Jared Kushner, Trump’s son-in-law, has any diplomatic experience in peace negotiations, nor has either ever set foot on Ukrainian soil?

The Realpolitik of Trump’s Foreign Policy

Under the Trump 2.0 administration, gone are the days of international diplomacy built on the principles of national sovereignty and mutual defense. In its place, we have transactional geopolitical relations driven by the question: “What can you do for me?”

If there is any doubt about Trump’s use of the US presidency to create business opportunities, then we need to look no further than a report published by Bloomberg News (May 2025) titled: The Trump Family’s Money-Making Machine.

According to Bloomberg, since the start of his 2024 reelection campaign for a second term, the Trump family’s net worth has more than doubled to about $5.4 billion. Boosted by aggressive real estate and cryptocurrency deals, corporate advisory work for his sons, and other ventures while he is president, the Trump family builds wealth by licensing the Trump name for high-profile projects. 

While in office, Trump and his immediate family’s business dealings generated over $10 billion in real estate value, $500 million from crypto sales, and millions more from stakes in companies tied to guns, drones, and financial services, amid reduced oversight on conflicts of interest. 

Although U.S. federal conflict-of-interest laws generally prohibit senior officials from holding business interests that their policy decisions could impact, presidents are exempt, presumably because America’s Founding Fathers never envisioned a corrupt presidency. 

With few legal restrictions and no moral opposition, Donald Trump freely interacts with foreign entities to pursue profitable business interests. 

Bloomberg News recently published a list of recent personal business deals with foreign nations, including expected revenues:

• Oman: Trump International Oman ($500 million)
• Saudi Arabia: Trump Tower Jeddah (~$533 million)
• Saudi Arabia: Trump Riyadh (~$530 million),
• United Arab Emirates: Trump International Hotel & Tower Dubai (>$544 million),
• Qatar: a Trump golf and villa project ($3 billion)
• Vietnam: planning a $1.5 billion complex golf and resort project
• India: a wave of new Trump‑branded towers in Indian cities with an estimated $1.75 billion in sales value.

Each of these five countries where Trump is doing business has serious, well-documented human rights problems in recent years, though the patterns of rights violations differ. Is Donald Trump likely to admonish these countries’ leaders for discrimination against outgroups? 

Indeed, Trump’s approach to America’s foreign policy seems to be based on corrupt quid pro quo deals. Each of these negotiating countries struck favorable trade agreements (mostly tariff reductions) with the Trump 2.0 administration.

Ukraine: A Leverage Point for U.S. Business Deals with Russia

As noted, nearly a year after his campaign promise of instant peace, Russia and Ukraine are still at war. In late November 2025, Donald Trump’s special envoy, Steve Witkoff, publicly presented a 28-point “peace plan” that was almost entirely dictated by Putin’s agents. 

Ukraine and Europe rejected this peace plan because it effectively grants Putin everything he wants to control Ukraine’s future. But was this really an attempt to end a deadly and unnecessary war, or was it a more sinister proposal from negotiators who value peace not for national sovereignty but for business advancement?

Recent reporting by the conservative Wall Street Journal (WSJ) exposes the true motives of the 28-point peace plan: multiple business deals that connectU.S. billionaires with Russian oligarchs.

The WSJ reporters describe how President Trump’s team is pursuing a “peace through business” approach to end the Ukraine war, centered on large U.S.–Russia commercial deals that would also reopen Russia’s economy and energy sector to American investors, alarming Ukraine and key European allies.

Additional reporting by The Daily Beast provides more details about the business deals hidden in the proposed peace plan. 

Putin’s war against Ukraine has had a very negative impact on Russia as a nation. Over one million troops have been killed or wounded. Russia’s economy has also suffered from its shift from domestic to wartime industries, as well as feeling the sting of Western sanctions that have frozen about $300 billion in Russian central bank assets.

Putin is now walking a tightrope between his fantasies of imperialist expansion, which create an economic drag in the short run, and regaining Russia’s financial stability in the long run. This existential conflict may be why Putin appointed Kirill Dmitriev, a business development officer, as the key figure who apparently wrote the 28-point peace plan.

As head of the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), Dmitriev has utilized this $10 billion state‑owned investment fund to attract foreign investments in projects related to Russian infrastructure, energy, healthcare, and technology.

Putin’s selection of Dmitriev as the chief negotiator for the peace plan, along with Trump’s commercial envoys, may explain how speculative business deals became the basis of the U.S./Russian plan to end the Ukrainian war, a plan that ignores the interests of Ukraine and Europe.

A Dangerous Historical Precedent

Both Ukraine and the European Union have reasons to fear that a post-war U.S./Russia dominance could lead to the disbandment of NATO and a future conflict between Russia and independent European nations. This concern is not without historical precedent.

In pre-WWII Europe, Adolf Hitler was building his military capacity to fulfill his expansionist dreams of conquering and controlling Europe with his Third Reich government. At the same time, Stalin’s USSR was still recovering from the economic devastation of World War I. In 1939, both Hitler and Stalin realized the advantages of a non-aggression pact that would serve as a resource and market deal wrapped in a non-aggression treaty built upon mutual supply-chain and profit calculations.

This shared mindset of mutual economic development led to the signing of the 1939 German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact, also known as the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact. In addition to the economic provisions of this pact, the terms included a “secret protocol” that divided much of Eastern Europe into German and Soviet “spheres of influence.” 

Hitler’s endorsement of the German/Soviet pact is another historical example of geopolitical leaders considering the politics of “What can you do for me?” The agreement brought mutual short-term benefits, but Hitler’s imperialist agenda was always his long-term plan. In the summer of 1941, Adolf Hitler broke the agreement by launching Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of the Soviet Union. Many regard this assault on the Soviet Union as the biggest strategic error in his war on Europe.

Parallels: The Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact vs. the Witkoff/Dmitriev Pact

It is not hard to see the similarities between the German/Soviet historical pact and the Russian/Ukrainian proposed pact. If we view the 1939 German–Soviet Non-Aggression Pact as an agreement between an expansionist Hitler and an economically focused Stalin, it becomes an eerily useful model for understanding the “Witkoff/Dmitriev Pact.” 

America’s Witkoff and Russia’s Dmitriev see self-serving economic gains from ending the Ukraine war. But Putin has a clear interest in expanding Russia’s border to resemble those of the Soviet Union.

Can Putin be trusted to follow the explicit and implicit economic plan for a post-war Europe – or would he use the nonaggression period to continue building his military with the aim of attacking former Soviet satellite countries?

Putin’s Obsession with Novorossiya

While speaking recently (June 2025) at the St. Petersburg Economic Forum, Vladimir Putin declared:

“I consider Russians and Ukrainians to be one people. In this sense, all of Ukraine is ours.”

If the EU and NATO expect Putin’s war against Ukraine to end soon, Putin’s speech at the forum did little to reassure them.

Vladimir Putin is a complex and cunning leader driven by many motivations. One core motivation is his persistent desire to recreate Novorossiya – “New Russia.” It is a motivation that will undermine all future peace efforts in Ukraine.

“New Russia” is not a vision of the future, but a recreation of the past – restoring “ancient Russian lands.” After the collapse of Tsarist Russia in 1917, the former Russian Empire fractured: Finland, Poland, and the Baltic states gained independence, while parts of the Caucasus and Central Asia broke away. 

As the USSR stabilized and then entered World War II, however, Moscow annexed or reabsorbed many of these territories—western Ukraine and western Belarus from Poland, the three Baltic states, Bessarabia and northern Bukovina from Romania, Tuva, and later southern Sakhalin and the Kuril Islands from Japan. By the late 1940s, the Soviet Union’s borders in the west and far east exceeded those of late Tsarist Russia.

The vision of Novorossiya is to restore the Russian Republic to the geopolitical prominence it had in the 20th century. This is a vision Vladimir Putin has held since his early days in power.

Andrew Goodman is a retired U.S. career diplomat and Senior Foreign Service officer with over thirty years of experience, mainly focusing on the USSR/Russia and European security. His work brought him to spend many hours with Putin in the 1990s, when Putin was beginning his public career as mayor of St. Petersburg.

In an article, Putin the Planner, Ambassador Goodman states that Putin’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine was not a reckless gamble but the result of a long‑standing, carefully planned strategy shaped by his risk‑averse, vindictive, and methodical political style. Goodman notes that Putin began contemplating the invasion of Ukraine in 2014 during the Obama administration.

Putin’s aggression against Ukraine developed in phases, starting with covert interference and ending in open war in 2014. In late 2013 to early 2014, Russia seized and unlawfully annexed Crimea, then supported an armed insurgency in eastern Ukraine’s Donbas region. Throughout 2014 to 2016, Moscow increased control over Crimea while conducting cyber, energy, and information campaigns against Ukraine and the West.

Russian aggression in Ukraine was met with “soft” sanctions by U.S. President Obama—diplomatic isolation and graduated economic sanctions. In 2019, Putin made gestures to Ukraine’s President Zelensky. When those failed, Putin hoped that Trump could be persuaded to join his efforts to sabotage Ukraine. Trump failed to be a useful operative. President Joe Biden’s election foreshadowed a revitalization of NATO. Putin needed to act, and on February 22, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine.

Reflecting on their many conversations, Goodman articulated Putin’s Novorossiya worldview:

Putin told me on numerous occasions that Russia needed to regain its status as a superpower. Putin did not trust the West: Western leaders were only helping Russia because it was in their own interest…(A)t some point, Russia would need to go its own way and stand up for its interests.

On Ukraine:

Putin viewed Ukraine as an unresolved problem. He took steps over a period of years that he thought would ensure the success of an invasion. Once he could no longer wait for an alternative solution, Putin launched it (the invasion of Ukraine) at the most opportune time. Whatever happens on the ground now, there is good reason to think that Putin will continue to pursue a solution on his terms as long as he remains in power.

On Putin’s resolute character:

(Putin) acted only if he was supremely confident of winning and only after making meticulous preparations. When Putin judged the odds to be most in his favor, he acted decisively. And once he had started something, he was determined to see it through, using all means at his disposal. Putin only stood down or sought an accommodation when instructed to by a higher authority or if confronted with a countervailing force.

The Clashing Worldviews of Trump and Putin: Une Folie d’un Seul

Should Ukraine and the European Union be concerned about a kleptocratic alliance between the United States’ Trump and Russia’s Putin aimed at undermining the sovereignty and wealth of Greater Europe?

Contrast Goodman’s portrait of Putin’s character with that of Trump’s, as told by POLITICO. In a recent POLITICO post, Donald Trump is The President Who Never Grew Up.

(Trump) has no more interest in (governing) than any pre-adolescent would, but he does like attention. That’s why the cameras are brought in nearly every day, for whatever executive order he is ostensibly there to promote or a foreign leader whose name he can’t always summon. The point is to see himself on TV. Of course, like any kid, that’s not the only screen he craves — which is why he spends so much time on social media, posting all manner of content his parents would disapprove of if they found his account.

Both Trump and Putin share traits of vanity and vindictiveness, but when it comes to pushing an autocratic worldview on the global stage, Trump’s effort to be a peer with Putin is a folly of one.

Putin is more intelligent and more cunning than Trump by many orders of magnitude. What does this mean for the end of Russia’s war against Ukraine? 

It’s worth recalling Ambassador Goodman’s experience with Putin during Putin’s rise to power. As Goodman observed when he was still new to great power:

Putin only stood down or sought an accommodation when instructed to by a higher authority or if confronted with a countervailing force.

As president of the Russian Federation, Putin holds the highest national authority. The only factor that could derail Putin’s Novorossiya ambitions is a countervailing force—either internal or external. Russia’s costly war with Ukraine might provoke internal countervailing forces, most likely among the elites. However, if there were a coup against Putin, there is no guarantee that his successor would be any less doctrinaire.

What about Putin being confronted with international countervailing forces? The European Union is unlikely to be strong enough to oppose Putin through economic or military measures without the support of the United States.

Also, Ukraine has weakened its political position with the recent revelation that Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, must explain and address corruption within his cabinet. 

The forces supporting and opposing Ukraine are more tangled and complex than ever. One key question is whether Trump will eventually separate from Putin to align with Europe? 

What is the Nature of the Trump/Putin Relationship?

Since the late 1980s, Donald Trump has repeatedly tried to start private business projects in Russia, beginning with a 1987 trip to Moscow to discuss a luxury hotel near the Kremlin. He also engaged in trademark filings, scouting visits, and joint-venture discussions with Russian partners throughout the 1990s and 2000s. In 2013, he took the Miss Universe pageant to Moscow in a profitable deal with oligarch Aras Agalarov, which he hoped would lead to a Trump-branded tower.

Those ambitions resulted in an October 2015 letter of intent with developer I.C. Expert Investment to build “Trump Tower Moscow,” a large mixed-use skyscraper, with negotiations continuing into 2016 even as Trump ran for president, though the project was ultimately abandoned and never built.

Despite decades of courting Russian partners, Trump never completed a single real estate project in Russia. And perhaps he never will. Still, Trump is drawn to, and is easily influenced by, Putin.

No one understands Trump’s adoration of Putin. A psychologist might speculate that this fixation relates to young Donald’s apparent emotional rejection by his father and mother. Given Donald Trump’s malignant and insatiable need for attention and praise, we can see that a lack of emotional support during his developing years would lead to his desire for the approval of a powerful and controlling authority figure, such as Vladimir Putin.

Whatever Trump’s motivation to win Putin’s favor—whether psychological or economic—it’s clear that Putin has no interest in Trump, except as a useful idiot. 

As of now, Putin seems dismissive of Trump’s peace plans, complaining that the plans do not address “territorial issues.” Echoes of Novorossiya?

What is the Future of Ukraine and the European Union?

These complex psycho-geopolitical dynamics between the United States and Russia (specifically, Trump and Putin) do not bode well for Ukraine, which is suffering from a merciless war, a corruption scandal, and a European Union that is now militarizing in anticipation of self-defense against Putin’s imperialist ambitions. 

Perhaps the only good news is that Donald Trump’s authoritarian power is declining. 

Even among Republicans loyal to Trump, there is a group of hawks who oppose Russia’s war against Ukraine. With Democrats likely to gain some control in the 2026 midterm elections, these Republican hawks might find their backbone to side with the Democrats to boost support for Ukraine.

Toward that distant and uncertain outcome, we can only hope.